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Vandiver: Partnerships and Business Corporations
PARTNERSHIPS AND BUSINESS CORPORATIONS
ROBR

E.

VANDmvR*

Partnerships
In the case of Wrenn v. Wreown and Wrennl three brothers, A,
the plaintiff-appellant, and B and C, the defendants-respondents,
constituted a parol partnership at will with no provision for dissolution. Dissatisfaction of A led to this action for dissolution and appointment of a receiver to wind up the partnership affairs. The
lower court ordered dissolution and directed that B should manage
the affairs of the partnership during dissolution with no interference
from A, each partner to be furnished semi-monthly business statements. The appointment of a receiver and order for the sale of
assets were denied.
The Supreme Court held that the effect of the above order was
to appoint B, a partner, as receiver, without bond and to exclude
from participation A, who had an interest in the property, and that
such resulted in an inequity and an error by the lower court in the
exercise of its discretion. It was the judgment of the Supreme
Court that a "competent, disinterested and impartial person . . .
should be appointed receiver . . . to liquidate and distribute the
partnership assets under the supervision of the Court," but that the
lower court was correct in refusing an order of sale, because such
a sale should follow the recommendation of the receiver, on which
all partners should be heard, to the purpose that the interests of
them and their creditors will be protected. The Supreme Court
pointed to the analytical, well-reasoned conclusions of Professor
Karesh in his landmark article2 on the Uniform Partnership Act
to justify the advisability of appointment of a non-partner receiver
in an action for partnership dissolution. This court also decided
that it is discretionary with the court to decide under the facts of
any particular case as to the necessity of appointing a receiver, citing
the general statutory authority for the appointment of receivers.4
Business Corporations

Under Section 10-421 of the ConE or LAWS oF SOUTHI CAROLINA,
1952, a proper service of a summons upon a domestic corporation
conferred jurisdiction over such corporation:
aMember ef Firm of Watkins, Vandiver & Freeman, Anderson, S. C.; A.B., 1939, Furman University; LL.B., 1940. University of South Carolina; Member Anderson County ad
South Carolina Bar Associations.

1. 228 S.C. 588, 91 S.E. 2d 267 (1956).
2. 3 S. C. L. Q. 471 (1951).

3. CODE OF LAWs OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952
OF SOUTH CAROLIt'A. 1952

4. CODE OF LAWs

§52-1, et seq.
§ 10-2301.
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In any county where such domestic corporation shall own property and transact business, regardless of whether or not such domestic corporation maintains an office or has agents in that
county.
In Hopkins v. Sun Crest Bottling Ca.5 the question before the
Supreme Court was whether the bottling company, a domestic corporation with its principal place of business at Florence, owned
property in Darlington County, where suit was brought against it,
so as to subject it to the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas Court
for Darlington County. The company operated in the customary

manner for the trade. Its drink product was bottled in Florence
and sold by Florence salesmen in crates of twenty-four bottles to
customers in Darlington County, each customer making a small deposit for each crate of bottles and receiving credit in the amount
of the deposit for every crate of bottles returned, the crates and
bottles being constantly returned to the Florence plant -and
remaining with the customer an average period of three days. The
majority opinion held that the crates and bottles were within Florence
County temporarily and transitorily, and not with a sufficient degree of
permanency to constitute property within the contemplation of Section 10421; and therefore that the Darlington court had no jurisdiction of the action. The two-man minority opinion disagreed, holding
that Section 10-421 did not specify or require that the property be of
any permanent nature or certain value and, therefore, that the crates
and hottles were clearly property within the meaning of the above
statute.
One of the greatest problems of the average practitioner is the
advising of clients on sets of facts coming within the so-called twilight zones of the field of law, whether such zones were inspired
legislatively, judicially, or from the nature of things. Perhaps it
is best but, as illustrated by the above case, there has been created
a twilight zone within what constitutes property within the purview
of the above mentioned statute. As in the twilight zone between
real property and personal property, there is not available, and understandablr so, the slide rule of the mathematician. No criticism
will be made, because the writer has never contended law to be an
exact science. The complexity and broadness of the field of law
and human behavior renders such impossible. But, at the risk of
indictment for wishful thinking, or possible banishment to the field
of engineering, the writer does hope and plead for more light in the
twilight zones.
5. 228 S.C. 287, 89 S.E. 2d 755 (1955).
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